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Abstract
Variation in how organisms allocate their behavior over their lifetimes is key to deter-
mining Darwinian fi tness, and thus the evolution of human and nonhuman decision 
making. This chapter explores how decision making varies across biologically and so-
cietally signifi cant scales and what role such variation plays when trying to understand 
decision making from an evolutionary perspective. The importance of explicitly con-
sidering variation is highlighted, both when attempting to predict economically and 
socially important patterns of behavior and to obtain a deeper understanding of the 
fundamental biological processes involved. Key elements of a framework are identifi ed 
for incorporating variation into a general theory of Darwinian decision making.
Why Is Variation in Decision Making Important?
Decision Making from a Darwinian Perspective
How individuals behave is of profound importance in both the human-centered 
and the biological sciences. In the human-centered sciences, as well as in at-
tempting to understand the human condition and what its key infl uences are, 
it is often important to be able to predict individual behavior and what will 
happen to it as a result of specifi c interventions. From an evolutionary perspec-
tive, for any evolved entity, how this entity behaves over its lifetime is central 
to determining how it accumulates resources and allocates them to the crucial 
demands of surviving to infl uence how its genes persist into future generations. 
From such perspectives, decision making—how individuals choose to allocate 
their behavior—is likely to be a key focus. Here we explore how decision mak-
ing varies, what role such variation is likely to play when trying to understand 
decision making from a Darwinian perspective, and how we can use such an 
understanding to promote more effective models of human behavior.
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Variation in Decision Making Matters!
Why focus on variation in decision making? The simple answer is that there 
is abundant evidence from a range of perspectives that the way in which the 
allocation of behavior varies really matters for understanding and predicting 
the human condition and in broader biological contexts. To briefl y illustrate:
Variation Is Needed to Predict What Actual People Do
Comparing the most popular process-based models of human behavior with the 
most successful applications of models of human behavior in the “real world” 
reveals an interesting distinction. The popular models (e.g.,  prospect theory; 
Kahneman and Tversky 1979) focus on capturing typical human behavior and 
pay little attention to individual differences. In contrast, many of the successful 
applications of behavioral models are based on the assumption that observed 
behavior refl ects robust individual differences in decision making. The most 
important examples of these applications are recommender systems that are 
used in e-commerce sites, like amazon.com (see Resnick and Varian 1997). 
These systems assume that future behavior of a target individual (e.g., a per-
son’s tendency to buy a specifi c product) can be predicted from the behavior 
of individuals that are similar to the target individual. In other words, these 
systems use past behavior to classify individuals to one of several classes, and 
use this classifi cation to predict behavior. Another important set of examples 
involve psychometric and psychological tests. These tests measure individual 
differences and are effectively used to predict future behavior. For instance, 
performance in the SAT test correlates signifi cantly (with coeffi cients between 
0.36 and 0.65) with performance in college (Ramist et al. 1993).
Personality Variation Infl uences Life Outcomes
In the  human domain, personality measures have been shown to predict con-
sequential life outcomes, such as mortality, divorce, occupational choice, oc-
cupational attainment, health, community involvement, and criminal activity 
(Ozer and Benet-Martinez 2006; Roberts et al. 2007). For example, one 14-
year prospective study found that the  personality trait of  trust predicted mortal-
ity with an effect size (r) of = –.22 (Barefoot et al. 1998). Another study found 
that girls’ scores on a test of  aggression predicted (r = .30) their likelihood of 
being divorced (vs. intact marriage) 28 years later (Kinnunen and Pulkkinen 
2003). A recent meta-analysis of prospective longitudinal studies that con-
trolled for background factors (e.g., existing health conditions, age, gender) 
found that the magnitude of effect sizes for personality on such important life 
outcomes were similar to those found for socioeconomic status (SES) vari-
ables and cognitive ability (Roberts et al. 2007). For example, in the domain of 
marital outcome, scores on  conscientiousness,  neuroticism, and  agreeableness 
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predicted divorce with average effects (r) of –.14, .18, and –.16, respectively; 
in the same set of studies, SES predicted divorce with average effects of .05 
(Roberts et al. 2007).
Variation Infl uences Society
Differences among human societies can result from a range of factors. These 
include the fact that small groups often consist of heterogeneous decision mak-
ers whose composition can differ substantially due to stochastic sampling ef-
fects, specifi c decision makers self-select into certain types of groups (e.g., 
assortative  matching), specifi c  voting or decision-making rules vary within 
groups, and preferences often shift (group polarization; for an early overview, 
see Pruitt 1971) as a direct consequence of group membership. An example of 
the latter, the “risky shift” (Stoner 1961), implies that groups consisting of, on 
average, more  risk-averse group members come up with even more risk-averse 
unanimous decisions, while groups whose members are, on average, more 
 risk-prone make more risky unanimous decisions. Thus, existing individual 
predispositions can be reinforced in the group decision-making process.
In general, it is unclear whether unitary groups—groups which do not have 
any internal confl ict in terms of objectives and that have to come up with a 
joint group decision—are “better” decision makers than individuals. The rela-
tive advantage of groups over individual decision makers depends on the na-
ture of the task, on the organization of the group, and the inclination to fall 
prey to group decision-making biases such as “ groupthink” (Janis 1972). One 
important advantage of group decision making is the possibility of aggregating 
knowledge if information is distributed heterogeneously among group mem-
bers. An apparent disadvantage of group decision making is the decision-mak-
ing process, which is supposed to be more complicated and slower in groups 
than in individuals. Both effects are likely to be signifi cant for individuals that 
self-select into groups. Across different simple economic tasks, a surprisingly 
uniform proportion of about two-thirds of human decision makers self-select 
into a group decision-making mode, whereas one-third prefers to decide alone 
(Kocher et al. 2006).
 Cultural Variation: Practices, Freedom, and Wasteful Consumption
The study  of  dress codes reveals two important variation-related problems. 
First, conservative religious groups use strict dress codes to control their 
members and reduce their ability to leave the group (Arthur 1999). The strict 
codes reduce the members’ opportunities to interact with members of other 
groups and facilitate enforcement of the groups’ rules. Thus, the among-group 
variation, implied by strict dress codes, helps reduce within-group variability 
and can impair the freedom of their members. At the same time, however, 
strict dress codes have many positive effects. Without dress codes, rich group 
From “Evolution and the Mechanisms of Decision Making,” edited by Peter Hammerstein and Jeffrey R. Stevens. 
2012. Strüngmann Forum Report, vol. 11, J. Lupp, series ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 978-0-262-01808-1. 
246 S. R. X. Dall et al. 
members can benefi t from signaling their high status with expensive clothes 
and/or with high within-person variability (e.g., changing and washing trou-
sers every day by modern Israelis).  It is easy to see that such outcomes can lead 
to wasteful cultural practices since “wastefulness” is often a reliable signal of 
wealth (e.g., modern Israelis use much more water than they otherwise would).
Variation Has Ecological Impacts 
Behavioral variation is often correlated with resource-use and resource-exploi-
tation strategies. Since competition is most intense among the most similar 
strategies, intraspecifi c competition may be reduced in the presence of varia-
tion. Variation may therefore be associated with a higher carrying capacity of 
the population. The same holds when different variants have a synergistic ef-
fect upon each other (such as in division of labor). For example, bold-shy pairs 
of  great tits seem to have a higher reproductive output than either bold-bold or 
shy-shy pairs (Both et al. 2005). Indeed, such variation seems to be important 
for reproductive outputs even where such effects are more complex, such as 
in zebra fi nches where partner matching is only important for the most explor-
atory and aggressive individuals (Schuett et al. 2011).
Some recent theoretical and empirical work in the fi eld of  animal  personali-
ty may be used to illustrate that variation may affect ecological processes (Cote 
et al. 2011; Fogarty et al. 2011). For example, Fogarty et al. (2011) modeled 
the spread of invasive species and concluded that the populations consisting 
of a mix of social and asocial individuals spread faster than populations con-
sisting of either one. Furthermore, experimental work on invasive fi sh species 
showed that the average level of  boldness in the population affected dispersal 
distance of individuals, implying that the social environment imposes selection 
on individual actions.
Variation Infl uences Evolution
It is well known to game theorists that the existence of even small degrees 
of random variation can have major implications for game theoretical predic-
tions. The  trembling hand approach (where optimal decisions are implemented 
with error) of Reinhard Selten (1975) is used in economic and evolutionary 
game theory to distinguish “unreasonable” equilibria (which only make sense 
in the absence of variation) from more reasonable ones. Indeed, such decision 
errors are crucial for solving the more computationally intensive game theo-
retic models such as state-dependent dynamic games, which are growing in 
popularity in evolutionary biology (Houston and McNamara 1999).
In addition to selecting among equilibria, new equilibria may become 
available if there is suffi cient (stable) variation in behavior. Several model-
ing studies on the evolution of  cooperation demonstrate, for example, that 
stable cooperation is achievable and stable once there is suffi cient behavioral 
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variation in the population (McNamara and Leimar 2010). McNamara et al. 
(2004) consider a fi nitely repeated  prisoner’s dilemma game where the inter-
action between two players is terminated once any of the players’ defects. In 
the absence of variation, “always defect” is the only equilibrium. If, however, 
nonadaptive alternative strategies arise repeatedly in the population (e.g., by 
mutation), then it may actually be adaptive to “exploit” this variation by adopt-
ing a slightly more cooperative strategy than always defect. This may initial-
ize a positive feedback process of “variation begets variation” that eventually 
leads to the establishment of cooperation. There is a second reason why varia-
tion can stabilize cooperation. Several models have stressed that partner choice 
and partner inspection are generally favorable for the evolution of  cooperation. 
However, choosiness and inspection will typically be costly. To persist stably 
in the population, these costs have to be off-balanced by some benefi ts. Such 
benefi ts can only accrue if there is variation (choosiness does not make sense, 
if there is no variation to choose among). Indeed, McNamara et al. (2008) 
showed that in a snowdrift game with partner choice, the degree of cooperation 
achieved was positively related to the degree of behavioral variation. In a dif-
ferent setup, Wolf et al. (2011) showed that small degrees of variation can se-
lect for social sensitivity which, in turn, stabilizes and enhances this variation. 
Again, the outcome is qualitatively different than in the absence of variation. 
Finally, McNamara et al. (2009) have shown how small amounts of variation, 
in how trustworthy individuals are, select for conditionally  trusting strategies 
which, in turn, select for further individual differentiation in trustworthiness.
In addition to changing the outcome of evolution in a qualitative way, the 
existence of variation can have a quantitative effect, since it can speed up evo-
lution enormously. Evolutionary biologists have always been amazed at how 
rapidly populations can adapt to novel circumstances. In particular, the rapid 
evolution of a highly integrated phenotype (requiring the evolution of correla-
tions among a multitude of traits) is, at least to some evolutionary biologists, 
an unresolved mystery; this is sometimes referred to as  Haldane’s dilemma 
(Haldane 1957). The existence of a “standing stock” of variation may pro-
vide an explanation. First, evolution is much less mutation limited in such 
cases. If selection can “feed” on existing variation, it does not have to wait 
for the appearance of the right type of mutations. In individual-based simula-
tions with realistic parameter settings, the mutation process typically imposes 
severe limitations on the speed of adaptation. This is particularly true in cases 
where selection has to “solve” a design problem in a multidimensional trait 
space. West-Eberhard (2003) suggested that a correlational structure as found 
in  personalities might enhance the adaptive potential of a population. These 
correlations might gradually be shaped by selection in reaction to small-scale 
fl uctuations of the environment. When the environment suddenly changes 
more dramatically (in the direction of the earlier small-scale fl uctuations), the 
required correlational structures are already in place and do not have to evolve 
from scratch.
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In addition to these direct effects on the course of evolution, the phenom-
enon of  personality differences (stable behavioral differences among individu-
als) may force scientists to reconsider evolutionary processes in a fundamen-
tally new way. Until now, the trend has been to atomize behavior into different 
functional contexts (e.g., fi nding food vs. fi nding mates vs. caring for young 
etc.), which are subsequently tackled in separate evolutionary models. This 
may be quite misleading. If, for example,  boldness in response to novel and 
potentially dangerous environments is fundamentally linked to  aggressiveness 
in intraspecifi c contests, it does not make sense to investigate the “boldness 
game” as being separate from the “aggressiveness game.” In fact, a behavior 
can appear maladaptive when viewed in isolation but make perfect sense (e.g., 
as a costly signal) when viewed from a more integrative perspective. There are 
several examples where this does indeed seem to be the case (e.g., Johnson and 
Sih 2005).
What Are the Scales at Which Decision Making Varies?
There is an interesting dichotomy between the human-centered sciences and 
biology in that there is a tendency in the former to assume stable individuality 
as the default. In contrast, students of nonhuman  animal behavior who think 
about its evolution tend to presume that behavior is highly flexible and opti-
mally tactical (from an evolutionary perspective) in every possible context. 
For the purposes of this chapter, it is important to provide a brief overview of 
the patterns of variation in behavior and decision making that are of interest 
to researchers of human and nonhuman behavior (i.e., that have signifi cant 
economic, social, and ecological consequences).
Temporal patterns of variation can be distinguished by whether they operate 
on developmental versus intermediate versus moment-by-moment timescales. 
Evolutionarily significant units of variation range from within an individual, 
among individuals, to groups and populations. The latter are distinguished bio-
logically by the fact that populations tend to be divided by gene fl ow, whereas 
groups are divided by behavior (interactions). In the human species, popula-
tions can be thought of as being synonymous with human cultures as they are 
both defined by limits to replicator spread (population: genes; culture: cultural 
replicators like memes). The key difference is that cultural barriers are very 
often permeable to highly adaptive (useful) variants (e.g., metal axes replacing 
stone axes), whereas this will not necessarily be the case for gene fl ow among 
populations.
Are all patterns of variation interesting? The term “ animal personalities,” 
for example, refers to variation in highly structured behavioral types: individu-
als differ in their behavior and these differences are correlated over time and 
across different contexts (e.g.,  aggression,  foraging, mating). To judge whether 
a given correlation is surprising, it seems important to have a “null model” 
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at hand; that is, a model of trait correlations (over time, across context) that 
serves as a standard of comparison. At present such a null model does not ex-
ist. This may be for good reasons: developing a nontrivial “general-purpose” 
null model in the context of behavioral types may be very diffi cult or even 
impossible. The trivial null model is that there are no correlations. This null 
model is not really interesting: rejecting it is like tearing down a straw man in 
which nobody really believes. The reason one does not believe in the trivial 
null model is that any “realistic” mechanism will create some correlations. 
However, the details of such correlations will depend very much on the mecha-
nisms in question. As a consequence, a nontrivial null model will have to refer 
to a specifi c underlying mechanism. This is problematic, since we typically do 
not have a good idea of what the “real” mechanisms are and what kind of cor-
relation structure they will generate. So, even if we ignore the fact that there is 
a multitude of such nontrivial null models, we are currently unable to charac-
terize their statistical properties (specifi cally or in general). Therefore, for the 
time being we will have to continue using “biological intuition” when judging 
whether observed correlation structures are interesting or not.
Are there any general patterns of variation nature?  Repeatability, the pro-
portion of the observed variance in the population that can be explained by 
stable differences among individuals, is of key importance when studying la-
bile phenotypic traits like behavior and physiology, and it has therefore been 
documented for a wide variety of behavioral traits across a wide range of spe-
cies. Recent meta-analyses show that values of repeatability are on average 
0.37, implying that a major proportion of the observed variation in behavior 
(e.g., up to 0.63) is within rather than between individuals of the same popu-
lation (Bell et al. 2009). Some of the variation in behavior is evident at the 
population level, shaped by local adaptation to population-specifi c ecological 
conditions like  predation  risk. For example, work on  three-spined sticklebacks, 
Gasterosteus aculeatus (Figure 15.1), revealed that 9.4% of phenotypic varia-
tion in  predator-inspection behavior could be attributed to variation among 12 
Welsh populations, 41.2% to variation among individuals within these popula-
tions, and 49.4% to within-individual variation (Dingemanse et al. 2007). To 
further illustrate how behavior and decision making varies at different scales, 
we now proceed by highlighting some interesting examples from the human-
centered and biological literature.
Variation within Individuals 
 Standard economic theory relies on the assumptions that individual preferenc-
es are relatively stable over time (Stigler and Becker 1977) and that behavior 
is well-approximated by assuming a representative individual, especially if the 
decision-making situation has a unique optimum or equilibrium. The former 
assumption implies that decision makers choose the same option in the same 
decision-making situation (under the same conditions/states) over time. The 
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latter assumption is not critical for the application of (game) theory, and more 
recent models often simply assume the existence of different types of decision 
makers with different optimal points (e.g.,  selfi sh types and reciprocal types) 
and specify their interactions formally. There is little dispute about the fact that 
the assumption of a representative individual is too restrictive in many situa-
tions. Different levels of  other-regarding preference (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Rabin 2002; Fehr et al. 2007), 
different degrees of rationality or  bounded rationality (e.g., Nagel 1995; Costa-
Gomes and Crawford 2006; Crawford and Iriberri 2007) and different attitudes 
toward  uncertainty (e.g., Abdellaoui et al. 2011) across decision makers lead to 
heterogeneity in fi nal choices and behavior.
The intertemporal stability/plasticity of individual  preferences in human 
decision makers is a much more controversial issue, and it affects the basic 
modeling methodology in standard microeconomics (e.g., crucial axioms 
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Figure 15.1  Variation in  predator-inspection behavior (ranging from shy to bold) 
across hierarchical levels. Histograms show the variation in “ boldness” at each level. 
(a) Distribution of the raw phenotypic data (n = 168 assays: 2 repeat assays for each of 7 
individuals within each of 12 populations). (b) Distribution of population-average val-
ues (n = 12 populations). (c) Distribution of individual-mean values (n = 84 individuals) 
expressed in deviations from the population mean (i.e., we show here the distribution 
of individual mean values within populations). (d) Distribution of the deviations from 
individual-mean values (n = 168 deviations) (i.e., the within-individual variance). The 
data used in this example are from exploration of altered environments by  three-spined 
sticklebacks (see Dingemanse et al. 2007).
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associated with preference revelation; Samuelson 1938). No one denies that 
 preferences could and would change over long time horizons (e.g., in the con-
text of trust/ trustworthiness and age; Bellemare and Kröger 2007; Sutter and 
Kocher 2007). However, studies that look at changes in behavior over short 
time horizons by the same decision makers have recently been conducted, and 
the results are not fully conclusive. Some fi nd quite high levels of robustness in 
behavior over time (Volk et al. 2012), others report very low levels of robust-
ness for the same behavioral tendencies in slightly different contexts (Blanco 
et al. 2011). Imprecision is also noted as one important reason for intertem-
poral instability (Butler and Loomes 2007). An empirical problem is that pro-
viding decision makers with exactly the same tasks over time is confounded 
with learning, and providing decision makers with similar tasks over time is 
confounded with potential context or  framing effects. Hence, intertemporal 
stability of individual preferences is hard to measure precisely in the controlled 
environment of an experiment.
Recent studies of  learning reveal an interesting general pattern: large within-
subject variability, which can sometimes swamp species differences. One indi-
cation of this pattern is presented by Erev and Haruvy (2012). Their review of 
the classical learning literature shows that many of the phenomena, originally 
documented in studies with different animals, can be reliably replicated in the 
study of human behavior in simple computerized experiments. One example 
is the partial reinforcement extinction effect (Humphreys 1939). Human and 
nonhuman subjects learn less in a noisy environment (under a partial  reinforce-
ment condition), but learning in this noisy setting is more robust to extinction. 
At the same time, the results of these studies reveal large within-subject vari-
ability (see Shafi r et al. 2008). For example, when faced with a repeated choice 
between “3 with certainty” or “80% chance to win 4; 0 otherwise” the typical 
subject does not learn to prefer one of the two options. Rather, the typical sub-
ject selects the risky prospect in about 60% of the trials. High within-subject 
variability was documented in human subjects even after 400 trials with im-
mediate feedback. Erev and Haruvy (2012) show that the main experimental 
results can be captured with simple models which share the assumption that 
subjects tend to rely on small sets (about four) of past experiences in similar 
situations. Different samples are used in different trials; as a result, these mod-
els imply a payoff variability effect (Myers 1960; Busemeyer and Townsend 
1993): large payoff variability increases within-subject variability.
Variation among Individuals 
 Variation in decision making among individuals can occur at different lev-
els. Individuals can differ in (a) the mechanisms that underlie behavior (e.g., 
physiological or cognitive systems underlying behavior), (b) their evaluation 
systems, and/or (c) states that affect decision making (e.g., information about 
features of the decision problem). A “decision-making mechanism” may be 
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viewed as a device that “chooses” an action (possibly in a nondeterministic 
way) for a given set of external stimuli and (external or internal) state vari-
ables. It makes sense to speak about “variation in decision making” if the un-
derlying decision-making mechanisms vary (i.e., if in a systematic way differ-
ent actions are chosen despite similar states and stimuli). Such variation can, 
for example, occur if individuals differ in the way they receive information 
(e.g., variation in receptors, as described for female sticklebacks), process that 
information, evaluate the processed information, translate this evaluation into 
action, and perform the corresponding action. One complication in the above 
description is the concept of “state.” When do we consider a “state” to be 
part of the decision-making mechanism, and when is it something external 
to it? For example, “ memory” may be viewed as a state that is external to the 
decision-making process (e.g., the memory of previous outcomes is an input 
of conventions like “ winner-loser” effects), but the use of memory may be a 
distinguishing feature of a decision-making mechanism. Even if state variables 
are clearly external to the mechanism, they may still create considerable con-
fusion. Let us assume that males and females differ substantially in the way 
they make decisions. Technically speaking, we could still consider this as the 
outcome of one and the same decision-making mechanism that has “gender” as 
one of its input variables. On the other hand, we can always assume that there 
are subtle, unobserved differences in state, when individuals are seemingly 
taking different decisions. So we have to be pragmatic. If we are interested in 
systematic variation in behavior that cannot in any “obvious” way be explained 
by differences in environment or differences in state, we should not forget that 
we are also interested in variation that is patterned, stable in time, and consis-
tent across contexts.
Ecologists and evolutionary biologists have provided convincing evidence 
for the existence of individual variation in decision making in a wide range 
of species. Empirical evidence for individual differences comes from stud-
ies in which the same set of individuals are assayed for the same behaviors 
repeatedly, such that the variation in the sample can be decomposed into be-
tween- and within-individual variation. Values of  repeatability, the proportion 
of total variance that comes from individual differences, suggest that the ma-
jority of the variation in behavior is within rather than among individuals in 
animal populations (Bell et al. 2009). Nevertheless, repeatable variation im-
plies that the average level of behavior differs among individuals; however, 
it does not imply that individuals are completely stable in their decision mak-
ing (see Figure 15.2a). Fleeson (2001, 2004) discusses similar issues in a  hu-
man  personality context. While the existence of repeatable variation is well 
documented, there is growing awareness that individuals may differ in how 
they change their behavior in response to variations in environmental condi-
tions or age— phenotypic plasticity (Dingemanse et al. 2010b; Nussey et al. 
2007). Plastic individuals alter their behavior as a function of  context, whereas 
nonplastic individuals do not (Figure 15.2b). Individual variation in plasticity, 
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termed “individual by environment interactions” in the evolutionary literature, 
usually explains about 5% of the variation in decision making within animal 
populations (Nussey et al. 2007).
As an example of long-term calibration of behavioral phenotype by some 
other characteristic, in humans, men who are physically large tend to be more 
 aggressive. However, it turns out that the key parameter is not adult size, but 
size relative to others at a certain age in adolescence (e.g., Pellegrini and Long 
2002). Men who are larger than their peers at this age adopt a more aggressive 
phenotype, and this persists even though their peers may subsequently grow to 
be as large as they are. This could be an example of what is referred to in the  hu-
man  personality literature as  reactive heritability. That is, size variation is heri-
table, and aggression is calibrated to this in development; thus aggression ends 
up showing effective heritability in behavioral genetic studies. A similar effect 
occurs with  extraversion, where it has recently been argued that much of the her-
itable variation is in fact variation in physical attractiveness. Attractive people 
are reinforced for initiating social interaction and become more extroverted as a 
consequence, causing an effective heritability of what is in fact a developmen-
tally calibrated trait (Lukaszewski and Roney 2011; Meier et al. 2010).
More generally,  dominance hierarchies provide good examples for system-
atic individual differences in behavior: individuals at the top of the hierar-
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Figure 15.2  Graphic depiction of how between- and within-individual variance com-
ponents are separated by plotting seven measurements of a behavioral decision (Y-axis) 
for fi ve individuals (numbered) whose behavior was assayed over an environmental 
gradient (X-axis). For example, the Y-axis might represent aggressiveness and the X-
axis conspecifi c density. (a) Gray lines represent the average phenotypic value of each 
individual; the variance among lines represents the between-individual variance. The 
variance in within-individual deviation from individual means represents the within-
individual variance. (b) Individuals differ in average phenotype as well as in  phenotypic 
plasticity.
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question) than individuals at the bottom. One might think that the position 
in the dominance hierarchy and, hence, behavior related to that position, just 
refl ects individual differences in fi ghting ability (“resource holding potential”). 
In a modeling study, van Doorn et al. (2003) showed that the “ winner-loser 
effects” on which dominance hierarchies seem to be based can evolve from 
scratch even if all individuals have the same fi ghting ability, irrespective of the 
outcome of previous fi ghts. In other words, winner-loser effects (and, hence, 
dominance hierarchies) may not be more than a “social convention”; that is, 
a conditional strategy which allows individuals to coordinate their actions, 
thereby avoiding escalated contests. Of course, differences in fi ghting ability 
will often be refl ected in an individual’s position in a dominance hierarchy. 
However, there are various indications that this is not the whole story. First, 
experiments with a variety of organisms have revealed that the position on a 
dominance hierarchy can actually be quite arbitrary (Hsu et al. 2006). In these 
experiments, groups with an established dominance hierarchy are taken apart 
and the individuals are reshuffl ed over new groups. After reshuffl ing, the posi-
tion of individuals in the newly establishing dominance hierarchies is often 
only loosely related to their position before reshuffl ing. Second, dominance is 
often site specifi c. Territorial animals are good examples: within its territory, 
an animal is dominant, although it is subdominant in the territory of another 
individual. The relative dominance status of two individuals A and B on neigh-
boring territories can thus be shifted from high to low by observing these indi-
viduals on the transect from the center of territory A to the center of territory 
B. Similarly, site-specifi c dominance is also observed in nonterritorial species, 
like oystercatchers in the winter (Ens and Cayford 1996) or white-throated 
sparrows (Piper and Wiley 1989). Here an individual A can be dominant over 
B at site X, while B is dominant over A at site Y; in contrast to territory own-
ership, the individuals are only loosely attached to the sites where they are 
dominant. In these cases,  dominance is apparently a social convention that is 
not explained by “obvious” differences, such as differences in fi ghting ability.
Beyond differences in competitive behavior, individuals can differ system-
atically in other ecologically important ways. For instance,  lions manifest two 
types of  social organization. Some are residents, living in groups, called prides. 
The pride usually consists of fi ve or six related females, their cubs of both sex-
es, and a coalition of males who mate with the adult females. The number of 
adult males in a coalition is usually two. Other individuals are called nomads, 
who range widely, often in pairs of related males. Males have to go through the 
nomad lifestyle before they can become residents in a pride, which is always 
different from the pride into which they were born. The resident males asso-
ciated with a pride tend to stay on the fringes, patrolling their territory. Both 
males and females defend the pride against intruders. The males associated 
with the pride must defend their relationship to the pride from nomad males 
who attempt to take over their residency position. When a group of male no-
mads oust the previous males associated with a pride, the conquerors often kill 
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any existing young cubs, presumably because females do not become recep-
tive until their cubs mature or die. A lioness will often attempt to defend her 
cubs fi ercely from a usurping male, but such actions are rarely successful. In 
addition to these sex and social role differences, there are strong individual dif-
ferences in the behavior of both male and female  lions. The classical example 
concerning female behavior comes from Heinsohn and Packer (1995:1260):
Female lions (Panthera leo) showed persistent individual differences in the 
extent to which they participated in group-territorial confl ict. When intergroup 
encounters were simulated by playback of aggressive co-vocalization, some in-
dividuals consistently led the approach to the recorded intruder, whereas others 
lagged behind and avoided the risks of fi ghting. The lead females recognized that 
certain companions were laggards but failed to punish them, which suggests that 
 cooperation is not maintained by  reciprocity. Modifi cation of the “odds” in these 
encounters revealed that some females joined the group response when they 
were most needed, whereas other lagged even farther behind. The complexity of 
these responses emphasizes the great diversity of individual behavior in this spe-
cies and the inadequacy of current theory to explain cooperation in large groups.
Several follow-up studies have been conducted and similar differences were 
found in experiments with males (Grinnell et al. 1995). Again, the males within 
a coalition strongly differ in their tendency to launch an attack on rivaling males.
Variation among Groups 
There  have been many reports of systematic between-group differences in 
lion behavior. For example, there are pronounced differences in how prides 
of similar size hunt down prey in cooperative hunting efforts. There are also 
pronounced differences in the ways groups of male nomads try to conquer a 
reproductive position in a pride. These differences, however, are diffi cult to 
quantify, and it is not clear whether such consistent differences among groups 
corresponds to something like a “group culture” or whether it is just a refl ec-
tion of the different “personalities” of their constituent members. The differ-
ences alluded to above have mainly been reported in books (e.g., Schaller 
1972), more general reviews (e.g., Packer 1986), or—not unimportantly—in 
nature documentaries (e.g., National Geographic: Super Pride). Nevertheless, 
work by Sapolsky (1990) indicates that there may also be stable differences 
in behavior among baboon groups that persist over generations. In one group, 
Forest troop, an outbreak of bovine encephalitis led to the death of several of 
the dominant males in the group. Compared to neighboring control groups, 
social relations in the Forest troop were peaceful. There was less aggression 
and more reciprocal grooming. Interestingly, this difference persisted over a 
ten-year period in which all of the original males died and were replaced by 
immigrant males.
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Group differences that emerge from simple interactions among individuals 
are well documented. Group composition is often infl uenced by locomotion 
performance (Krause and Ruxton 2002) and can be seen in fl ocks of birds, 
schools of fi sh, and herds of mammals (Couzin and Krause 2003). For ex-
ample, herds of African ungulates are often structured according to walking 
speed, with faster individuals at the front and slower individuals at the back 
of the group. In the extreme, this can result in social segregation with lactat-
ing and nonlactating females in zebras forming distinct herds (Gueron et al. 
1996). Another mechanism that can structure ungulate herds is active prefer-
ence. For example, Thomson’s gazelles, Gazella thomsoni, actively associate 
with Grant’s gazelles, Gazella granti, because the latter are taller and have a 
greater ability to detect an approaching predator, such as a cheetah, Acinonyx 
jubatus (FitzGibbon 1990). Grant’s gazelles appear to benefi t, in turn, from the 
presence of the Thomson’s gazelles because the latter are the preferred prey of 
cheetah. Given an attack on the group, the per capita risk of a Grant’s gazelle is 
therefore lowered by the greater group size, due to the presence of Thomson’s 
gazelles.
Variation may also exist at higher levels in a hierarchy. In particular, popu-
lations might be comprised of social neighborhoods differing in decision mak-
ing. Variation among social groups has, for example, been observed in shoal-
ing fi sh, where shoals within the same population differ in average behavior 
(Magnhagen and Staffan 2005). Indeed, between-group variation can emerge 
at equilibrium when members of different groups are motivated to behave like 
members of their group, and are punished when they behave like members of 
other groups. This can be illustrated in a multiagent market game that is played 
by 20 players: 10 Red and 10 Blue players. Each player has to select a location: 
left or right. Agent j gains 1 point for every other member of j’s group who se-
lects like her, and loses 1 point for each member of the outside group that does 
likewise. At equilibrium, all Red players will select one location and all Blue 
players will select the other. 
Factors that motivate group members to behave similarly are well docu-
mented. Social contagion (“peer effects” in economics) is typically thought 
of as imitative behavior that is not merely a result of homophily or of the 
fact that neighboring social agents are likely to be subject to common infl u-
ences. Specifi cally, there has been much recent interest in research surround-
ing suggestions that imitative behavior evolves in networks over time, such 
that smoking cessation and levels of alcohol consumption propagate readily 
through  social networks (Christakis and Fowler 2007, 2008). It is, however, 
diffi cult to separate correlated infl uences (Ioannides and Topa 2010; Manski 
1993), so interpretation remains controversial (e.g., Cohen-Cole and Fletcher 
2008). Why does  social contagion occur?  Imitation can serve a  social learn-
ing role (Chamley 2003), may reduce cognitive effort (Epstein 2001), or may 
refl ect a concern with relative social position (e.g., Clark and Oswald 1998). 
The social contagion literature has remained largely silent (or has made claims 
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inconsistent with other literature) as to how exactly the relevant social com-
parisons occur mechanistically. Effects related to  social contagion have been 
extensively studied in agent-based network models. Such approaches (e.g., 
Schelling 1978) have provided useful insights into areas such as  collective be-
havior in  ants and traders (Kirman 1993),  swarming behavior (Reynolds 1987), 
crowd behavior (Dyer et al. 2009), population group size (Axtell et al. 2002), 
cultural dissemination (Axelrod 1984), and imitative voting (Bernardes et al. 
2002). Most of these models incorporate an  imitation parameter or mechanism 
of some kind, such that agents in a network are likely to change in the direction 
of or infl uence other (typically local) agents with whom they are connected. It 
is then typically shown that interesting emergent behavior or segregation arises 
as such networks evolve.
Variation among Populations/Cultures
Variation among populations has been given substantial attention in the animal 
behavior literature, particular with regard to the question of whether popu-
lations with different ecologies (e.g., that vary in predation risk, population 
density, food availability) differ in the average level of behavior expressed 
(Magurran 1998). For example, populations of fi sh which live in environments 
with a high predation  risk are on average less bold compared to populations 
that experience a low predation risk (Huntingford et al. 1994).
 Human  personality research has implied that the structure of behavior, as 
captured by the  Big 5  personality traits, is similar in different cultures: one 
might not always get exactly the same structure, but it is remarkable how often 
similar dimensions arise (e.g., Gosling and John 1999; Weinstein et al. 2008; 
McCrae and Allik 2002). In contrast, comparisons of behavioral syndrome 
structure (the direction and strength of correlations between behaviors) across 
animal populations do not generally confi rm such ubiquity. For example, com-
parative work on  three-spined sticklebacks mentioned above reveal that the 
ecological conditions of populations, particularly  predation risk, predict syn-
drome structure. Specifi cally, populations of sticklebacks may generally be 
characterized by positive associations between aggressiveness, activity, and 
exploratory behaviors, but these associations are tighter in populations living 
sympatrically with predatory fi sh, both in European (Dingemanse et al. 2010a; 
Dingemanse et al. 2007) and North American populations (Bell 2005; Bell 
and Sih 2007). Therefore, it appears that local selection regimes shape trait 
associations, which may explain population differences in genetic correlation 
structure across North American populations (Bell 2005). At the same time, 
there is also evidence that certain genes are only expressed in the presence, and 
others only in the absence, of predators (Dingemanse et al. 2009), implying 
that any population differentiation at the phenotypic (observable) level is not 
necessarily underpinned by population-genetic variation.
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In studies on humans, there is an enormous body of literature which as-
sesses the robustness of results to  cultural variation fi rst found in simple lab-
based economic decision-making situations in Western countries. Attitudes to 
uncertainty, negotiation behavior, cooperative behavior,  reciprocity,  trusting 
behavior, sanctioning behavior, and many more have been compared in con-
trolled and incentivized studies with human decision makers across different 
cultures. Overall, differences between student populations in different coun-
tries are much smaller than expected a priori. Exceptions to this trend seem to 
be for punishment  behavior (Herrmann et al. 2008) and perhaps  conditional 
cooperation (Kocher et al. 2008); other differences have also been found, but 
they are not always robust. Sometimes the variation in behavior within a given 
culture is greater than the variation in behavior across cultures (Kocher et al. 
2008), but defi ning the boundaries can be diffi cult. Numerous studies for the 
 ultimatum game, for instance, have reported small or nonexistent differences 
in the behavior of student participants in experiments across different countries 
around the world (for an overview, see Camerer 2003).
In contrast, larger and persistent differences emerge when comparing stan-
dardized behavioral tests in small-scale societies. Henrich et al. (2004) fi nd that 
the behavioral variation across 15 selected small-scale societies when playing 
standard economic games (ultimatum game, public goods game) is extremely 
high, but it is consistently related to two factors: the higher the degree of mar-
ket integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation, the greater is the level 
of cooperation in experimental games. Nevertheless, recent studies show that 
potential cross-cultural differences in norms are not simply changed in dif-
ferent cultural environments. While humans, for instance, tend to adjust their 
tipping behavior when they travel (Azar 2004), they do not make (full) adjust-
ments in other domains. Fisman and Miguel (2006) show that UN diplomats 
from high corruption countries accumulate signifi cantly more parking tickets 
in New York. Note that diplomatic immunity implies that there is almost zero 
legal enforcement for these violations. Hence, a standard model of decision 
making would not predict any differences, and the results indicate that norms 
are transported to different situations.
What Proximate Mechanisms Underpin 
Variation in Decision Making?
Patterns of human and nonhuman behavior have been the subject of substantial 
research for many years. It is evident from our brief tour of behavioral variation 
at different scales that such patterns can vary substantially. Therefore, it is im-
portant to review the range of mechanistic processes that can give rise to varia-
tion in decision making over the psychologically, economically, and ecologi-
cally signifi cant scales that we have focused on in this chapter. Such processes 
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can be thought of as falling within the remit of the so-called “proximate” ex-
planations (Tinbergen 1963) for the existence of variation in decision making.
Within Individuals 
At  the most fundamental level, the physiological mechanisms that control be-
havior (e.g., neural processes) are likely to be subject to stochasticity in the 
basic biochemical processes that underpin them (e.g., due to quantum fl uctua-
tions at the molecular level). The details of such “essential stochasticity” (e.g., 
synaptic noise) are likely to be important as they may generate substantial 
within-individual variation in behavioral outcomes.
Beyond neurophysiological noise, cognitive processes can also generate 
behavioral variability. The  decision-by-sampling model (Boyce et al. 2010; 
Stewart et al. 2006)—a cognitive model of human judgment and decision 
making—assumes that attributes are judged in terms of their ranked position 
within a retrieved sample context (for further details, see Brown et al., this 
volume). Thus variability within individuals can result from different samples 
being retrieved from memory on different occasions, or from changes in choice 
context. Cognitive models have addressed the role of cognitive (and poten-
tially variable) samples in drawing inferences and making judgments (see, e.g., 
Fiedler and Juslin 2005). For example, the  MINERVA-DM model (Dougherty 
et al. 1999) has been used to explain judgments of likelihood within a memory 
model, and limitations of and individual differences in the capacity of general 
working  memory have been referred to in accounting for bias in probability 
judgment (Dougherty and Sprenger 2006). Another tradition of research rel-
evant to variability has suggested that participants represent distributions (e.g., 
of the location of an item in a sequence) but use samples from these distribu-
tions to make judgments, which can be repeated leading to improved average 
estimates such that successive estimates have uncorrelated errors (Vul et al. 
2009; Vul and Pashler 2008).
Models of decision making via  heuristics (e.g., Kahneman et al. 1982; 
Payne et al. 1993; Gigerenzer et al. 1999) posit that many choices and judg-
ments are made using  simple heuristics or  rules of thumb, which often yield 
“good” decisions when used in appropriate contexts. These heuristics typically 
use little information and process it in a limited manner to allow rapid (or 
“ fast and frugal”) decision making, making them an evolutionarily plausible 
alternative to traditional  axiomatic approaches to rationality. Many heuristics 
have been explored that are algorithmically specified in terms of their exact in-
formation-processing steps. Less well-explored and understood are the means 
by which different heuristics are selected to apply to different tasks, which 
could be a considerable source of both within- and between-person variability 
in decision making. Studies have found evidence for appreciable variation in 
the use of heuristics across individuals (Bröder 2012; Gigerenzer et al. 1999), 
often because different heuristics can produce approximately the same quality 
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of decisions in particular tasks. Indeed, it is considered important to compare 
the ability of multiple heuristics to account for participant data, so that this 
between-person variability can be discovered (Brighton and Gigerenzer 2011); 
less is known about variability in each individual’s use of particular heuristics 
over time or in different situations. Variability in the decisions made by an indi-
vidual (as opposed to variation in which heuristics they use) can be accounted 
for by specifi c heuristics. Many  heuristics are deterministic in their operation 
and thus will not produce this variation—one example is  take-the-best, which 
chooses between two options (e.g., which of two desserts has more calories) 
by comparing one cue or feature at a time until the fi rst cue is found that points 
to one or the other option (e.g., fi rst considering how much butter each dessert 
contains, and then if butter content is equal, considering how much sugar each 
has, and so on). In this case, the cues are searched in a fi xed order, which can 
vary between people based on their learning history (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 
1996). Other related heuristics incorporate external environmental infl uences 
or stochasticity to create decision-to-decision variability. For instance, the take-
the-last heuristic operates similarly to take-the-best but uses cues that were 
previously successful in producing choices (introducing variability through 
contingencies of learning), whereas the minimalist heuristic uses cues in a ran-
dom order. Other heuristics base their decisions on aspirations determined by 
samples experienced over time, which will vary from one set of experiences 
to another (as in sequential mate search by Miller and Todd 1998; see also the 
 sample-based heuristics in Pachur et al. 2011).
From the standard economic perspective, it is constructive to distinguish 
between two sources of variability in behavior. The fi rst class involves vari-
ability that can be observed even if individuals are fully informed of the incen-
tive structure and are fully rational (i.e., behavior is at a Nash equilibrium). 
Within-subject variability emerges at equilibrium in situations in which the 
agents do not want to be predictable. One set of examples of this comes from 
constant sum games with unique equilibria, like the  matching penny game pre-
sented in Table 15.1.
A second source of variability includes variation that is likely to emerge 
when the agents do not know the incentive structure and have to rely on their 
past experiences (Erev and Haruvy 2012). One source of within-subject varia-
tion in this setting is  exploration. Some level of exploration is necessary (and 
assumed by all learning models) to collect information. Another source of 
within-subject variability is assumed by sampling models of learning. These 
models imply that different choices are expected to be based on different 
Table 15.1  A  two-person matching penny game.
A2 B2
A1 1, –1 –1, 1
B1 –1, 1 1, –1
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samples of past experiences. A third source of individual variability involves 
behavioral changes that can be described as adjustments to changes in incen-
tive structure. One set of examples comes from the effect of  aging, which can 
lead to within- and between-subject variation in behavior. Indeed, there is an 
extensive literature on age changes in personality, but to link this to changes 
in “incentive structure” it is probably worth distinguishing the “internal” (e.g., 
puberty) and “external” (e.g., having children, getting a job) infl uences that can 
impact age changes (e.g., Roberts et al. 2006; Roberts and Wood 2006; Soto 
et al. 2008, 2011; Srivastava et al. 2003), and translate these into incentives.
Among Individuals
Continuing  to think economically, between-subject variability can emerge at 
equilibrium in situations in which the payoff for each rational agent decreases 
with the number of other agents that behave like her. A simple subset of this 
set of situations is represented in the market game, presented in Table 15.2, in 
which each of two sellers has to select between two locations, and payoffs are 
maximized (for both players) when each seller select a different location. At 
the pure strategy equilibrium of the game, the sellers select different locations 
(i.e., there is variation in the choice of position).
More generally, there are a range of processes that can underpin variation 
among individuals in how behavior is expressed. On the one hand, it is possi-
ble for individuals to be employing exactly the same decision-making process 
(e.g., the same rule for allocating behavior as conditions vary) while experi-
encing different local conditions from one another (e.g., being more or less 
hungry due to idiosyncratic—chance—recent history of access to food). This 
can cause individuals to differ from each other in how they behave at any giv-
en moment in time. Indeed, one source of learning-induced between-subject 
variability is implied by the fact that different agents are likely to experience 
different outcomes. Alternatively, it could be that individuals follow distinct 
decision-making processes (e.g., due to genetic variation in condition-depen-
dent behavioral rules), in which case differences in behavior among individu-
als will be evident even if individuals have had exactly the same experiences. 
For instance, some models of learning assume between-subject variability in 
learning parameters. 
There can be substantial impacts of early developmental conditions on how 
individuals behave. Such ontogenetic programming (e.g., early environment 
and maternal effects) can amplify slight (e.g., stochastic) initial differences 
Table 15.2  A  two-person market game.
A2 B2
A1 –1, –1 1, 1
B1 1, 1 –1, –1
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in experience or nutrition and lead to profound differences in the way that 
individuals behave. For example, Bateson et al. (2004) have argued substan-
tial variation in adult human eating behavior can be explained by early life 
physiological “programming” by maternal nutritional status during pregnancy. 
Mothers that are nutritionally stressed while pregnant induce fetuses to “ex-
pect” food to be limited and so switch on a “thrifty phenotype” in their prog-
eny, who crave energetically dense foods and store fat whenever possible. This 
effect is argued to underpin a signifi cant amount of the variation in patterns of 
obesity and Type II diabetes being documented in modern, food-rich devel-
oped societies. 
Among Groups 
As in  between-individual  variation, it is important to appreciate that variation 
among groups can emerge in two distinct ways. First, different groups may be 
formed by distinct types of individuals. For instance, in many species, males 
and females often have different basic (e.g., energetic) demands, and therefore 
they behave differently and form separate groups (Ruckstuhl 2007). Second, 
individuals may not necessarily vary in any fundamental sense among groups 
(i.e., they all follow the same decision rules) but the group-conditions may vary 
idiosyncratically (e.g., different groups just happen to be different sizes, which 
cause different levels of antipredatory vigilance). A good illustration of this: 
mechanisms for individual  social learning—essentially,  copying the behaviors 
of others—can result in behavioral differences between groups as a result of 
within-group social convergence (e.g.,  conformity) after different starting con-
ditions. That is, if asocial learners in one group hit upon a particular behavior, 
and those in another group discover a different behavior, social learners in 
both groups may copy those asocial learners, as well as each other, to the point 
where the two groups diverge in their behavioral profiles. A number of social 
learning rules have been explored, which can be roughly broken down into 
those determining when copying should happen and others directing whom to 
copy (Laland 2004). “When” rules trigger the application of a social learning 
strategy and include copying when a current behavior is unproductive, copying 
when learning asocially (e.g., through trial-and-error) is too costly, and copy-
ing when the environment, and hence the appropriate behavior, is uncertain. 
“Who” rules specify the other model individuals whose behavior should be 
copied, and different rules can determine whether or not and how quickly a 
population will converge on a shared behavior. Such conformity is promoted 
by the widely studied copy-the-majority rule (Boyd and Richerson 1985), as 
well as by copying successful individuals, and possibly copying others if they 
are just doing better than oneself. Within-group convergence is unlikely if in-
dividuals use a copy-the-rare rule, adopting uncommon behaviors of others, 
though this can be individually advantageous if having a novel behavior (e.g., 
mating display) enhances local (or even group)  competitiveness. Rules for 
From “Evolution and the Mechanisms of Decision Making,” edited by Peter Hammerstein and Jeffrey R. Stevens. 
2012. Strüngmann Forum Report, vol. 11, J. Lupp, series ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 978-0-262-01808-1. 
Variation in Decision Making 263
copying others in one’s social network can lead to within-group homogeneity 
or heterogeneity depending on the network structure (Lieberman et al. 2005).
 Language acquisition can be a pervasive social force for group differentia-
tion in humans. Infants come into the world prepared to be part of any culture 
and language group. At birth, humans (like other primates) can distinguish any 
phoneme produced in any language around the world (Kuhl 1991; Kuhl et al. 
1992). However, during the fi rst year of life, perceptual tuning results in a loss 
of function: sounds that a newborn can distinguish (e.g., phonemic distinctions 
present only in Mandarin) are no longer distinguishable by, for example, an 
English-speaking one-year-old. Even brief exposure to a nonnative language 
can keep this perceptual window open. However, preservation of this ability 
depends on live social interaction. A 10-month-old from an English-speaking 
household who interacts with a Mandarin speaker for an hour a week will 
continue to distinguish the Mandarin phonemes at 12 months; a 10-month-old 
exposed to identical input from a video display will not (Kuhl et al. 2003). 
Case studies of hearing  children of deaf adults also suggest that live human 
interaction is critical for language learning. A hearing child (1 years 8 months) 
who interacted only with his deaf mother but had abundant exposure to spoken 
English  through television had no productive spoken language before interven-
tion; his brother (3 years, 9 months), who briefl y attended an English-speaking 
preschool, also exhibited severe delays (Sachs et al. 1981). These fi ndings sug-
gest that although widespread cultural transmission through media may reduce 
cross-cultural variability in human populations, specifi c aspects of human cog-
nitive development may tend to maintain cultural differentiation. In particular, 
as long as there are distinct language groups among adults, those distinctions 
will be conserved insofar as children only learn language by interacting with 
the  human beings in their immediate vicinity.
How Can Variation in Decision Making Evolve?
Given our focus on decision-making agents that are subject to Darwinian se-
lection, it is appropriate to consider the evolution of  variation in decision mak-
ing, the so-called “ultimate” explanations (Tinbergen 1963) for its existence. 
Indeed, for many of the scales of variation we have discussed so far, there has 
been signifi cant research effort devoted to understanding how variation in de-
cision making can be favored by Darwinian selection.
Within Individuals
It is possible that individual behavior will vary in different contexts because 
there are distinct modules in the central nervous system that operate inde-
pendently to control behavior for functionally (biologically) distinct types of 
problems (e.g., when foraging vs. choosing mates vs. caring for young, etc.). 
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Such  modularity may be adaptive because the fundamental (e.g., statistical) 
properties of the problems posed in the different contexts may differ quite 
substantially, such that completely different control processes are required to 
maximize performance in each biological “domain.” It is also possible that 
modularity could act as a within-individual “hedging of bets” when there is 
substantial, irreducible uncertainty about the environment on a moment-by-
moment timescale (Dall 2010), such that knowing what the appropriate set of 
responses is likely to be at any moment in time is too diffi cult (and requires too 
broad a range of responses) to allow a general-purpose decision rule to evolve. 
Nevertheless, the existence of module-general common resources (e.g., infor-
mation, energy) or control traits (e.g., sensory systems) will erode modularity 
and could structure individual behavior across contexts (functional domains). 
Wolf and Weissing (2010) discuss how the latter can select for cross-context 
correlations in behavior.
Individual behavior often varies over time as a result of  learning. The con-
ditions under which we would expect learning to evolve are relatively well 
understood (Stephens 2007). For prior experiences to improve decision mak-
ing (i.e., allow for a better fi t between behavior and current conditions) there 
has to be some degree of patterning of ecologically important events over 
time. However, because learning can be costly in terms of effort, time, and the 
maintenance of complex decision-making “machinery,” if environments are 
too patterned in their states (i.e., do not change enough over generational time) 
then “hard-wired” behavior (e.g., that does best in the average environment) is 
likely to evolve. From such a perspective, Stephens and colleagues (reviewed 
in Stephens 2007) have developed a framework for predicting variation in the 
adaptive value of learning/behavioral plasticity by specifying uncertainty and 
reliability of experience on orthogonal axes. Their predictions were corrobo-
rated using experimental evolution in  Drosophila and setting  blue jays operant 
tasks in the lab. In a similar way, ontogenetic changes in reproductive value 
and ability (more generally: changes in fi tness trade-offs with state) can drive 
longer-term variation in behavior as a function of the judicious use of informa-
tion over a lifetime, when such  phenotypic plasticity is adaptive.
One infl uential approach to analyzing the behavioral consequences of in-
formation use (including learning) from an evolutionarily adaptive perspective 
involves the application of  statistical decision theory (Dall et al. 2005), which 
makes extensive use of inductive ( Bayesian) inference. Most organisms, re-
gardless of cognitive complexity, have to make guesses about the world: Is 
that a bright red berry in dim light or a dull red berry in bright light? Is that 
prickly looking animal going to eat me or can I eat him? Should I go to this 
restaurant or that one? The problem of  inductive inference is the problem of 
trying to make a decision under  uncertainty; many conclusions are possible 
given the data, and the organism must choose just one. Bayesian inference 
provides a computational-level, ideal (adapted) observer and analysis of how 
background knowledge should be integrated with statistical data to narrow 
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the hypothesis space. These models can be applied to problems of induction 
across species and cognitive domains. They have been used to describe  forag-
ing decisions in a wide range of species (Krebs et al. 1978): problems of visual 
perception (Yuille and Kersten 2006), decision making in sensorimotor control 
(Körding and Wolpert 2006),  language acquisition (Chater and Manning 2006) 
and many aspects of abstract, higher-order cognition (Tenenbaum et al. 2011). 
Specifi cally, Bayes’s law provides a rule for how an organism might evaluate 
a hypothesis, h, about the process that produced some data, D. Bayes’s law 
states that the probability of the hypothesis given the data, P(h|D), depends 
on both the prior probability of the hypothesis, P(h), and the likelihood of the 
hypothesis, P(D|h): the probability that the data would have been observed 
if the hypothesis were true. That is, P(h|D) = P(h)P(D|h). We can borrow a 
simple example to illustrate (see Tenenbaum et al. 2011): Imagine you observe 
some data D—your child is coughing. You can consider many hypotheses, 
including, (h1) your child has a cold, (h2) your child has lung cancer, (h3) 
your child has the stomach fl u. Colds and stomach fl u in children are common; 
lung cancer is not. Thus prior probabilities favor h1 and h3. However, if your 
child has either a cold or lung cancer, it is very likely that she will cough; it is 
less likely that she will cough if she has the stomach fl u. Thus the likelihood, 
P(D|h), is higher for h1 and h2 than h3. Integrating both the prior and the likeli-
hood suggests that you should decide that your child has a cold. From where 
do prior beliefs originate? In our example, they came from common cultural 
knowledge about the prevalence of childhood diseases. The transmission of 
such knowledge is critical to  cultural  learning in human cognition. However, 
constraints due to prior knowledge can come from many sources, including 
both the individual organism’s own past experience and evolutionary adap-
tations (i.e., selective “experience” of one’s reproductive lineage; Dall et al. 
2005). In solving problems of visual perception, for instance, prior knowledge 
may include an evolved constraint to assume that illumination comes from a 
single, overhead source (i.e., the Sun).  Bayesian inference, therefore, formal-
izes the claim that background knowledge is integrated with new data to af-
fect judgment and decision making. This ability to integrate prior knowledge 
and statistical information supports rapid, accurate, inference across a range of 
problems and goals. Particularly relevant to decision making, formal analyses 
suggest that organisms whose decisions approximate the output of Bayesian 
inference models will out-compete organisms using other strategies when ani-
mals are contending for resources (Ramsey 1926/1980; de Finetti 1937/1980). 
Critically, however, Bayesian inference models provide  computational-level 
accounts of cognition (Marr 1982): they describe optimal decision making 
given a particular set of constraints and data, but they do not prescribe the 
ways these computational outcomes are instantiated. Many different algo-
rithms can approximate the output of Bayesian inference models, and these 
algorithms might, in turn, be implemented by many kinds of neural systems. 
Thus although evolution might favor organisms that approximate the output 
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of normative models, there might be substantial variability in the mechanisms 
underlying decision making across species.
Another major source of behavioral variability in many species comes 
from variation in “self-control” in different contexts. Nonhuman animals com-
monly prefer immediate rewards. This is paradoxical in the sense that they 
often prefer smaller, sooner benefi ts even when they could achieve a higher 
overall intake rate by choosing a more delayed but larger alternative. There 
is, of course, a large literature on this topic that goes under several headings: 
delay discounting,  intertemporal choice, self-control, and failure to delay grati-
fi cation. Superfi cially, at least, this so-called self-control problem resembles 
naturally occurring patch  exploitation because when an animal chooses to stay 
longer in a food patch, it is “choosing” an alternative in which it takes longer 
and acquires more food. In the “self-control” literature, however, the time be-
tween trials typically does not affect preference, whereas in  patch exploitation 
the so-called travel time is a consistently powerful variable: animals spend 
longer in patches when travel times are longer (Stephens and Krebs 1986). 
This problem has been studied by Stephens and colleagues by creating two 
types of choice situation (e.g., Stephens and Anderson 2001). One test situa-
tion involves a typical self-control situation:  blue jays were offered a binary, 
mutually exclusive choice between a smaller-sooner and larger-later option. 
The second situation sought to create an economically similar situation that 
was more “patch like.” To achieve this, a situation is created in which the 
jays had to choose between leaving and staying. The “stay” option led to a 
“larger-later” option, whereas the “leave” option resulted in a smaller-sooner 
option. The key result is that jays in the self-control situation behaved in a 
typically impulsive way, and they performed relatively poorly; in contrast, jays 
in the patch situation achieved high rates of intake (nearly optimal). In short, 
in patch-like situations, jays achieve a high level of performance, whereas in 
the self-control situation they perform relatively poorly. The hypothesis put 
forth by Stephens et al. is that the choice rules used by the jays evolved to 
make decisions that are more like patch exploitation than binary mutually ex-
clusive choice; thus the rules perform better in the situation that more closely 
resembles the problems they have faced in their evolutionary past. They re-
mark that it does not necessarily follow that jays are less impulsive in the patch 
situation; instead, the patch situation could be a case where an “ impulsive 
rule” performs well (for the mathematical reasoning to support this claim, see 
Stephens and Anderson 2001). This has been termed the  ecological rational-
ity hypothesis of impulsivity. Here, the phrase ecological rationality means, 
crudely speaking, that the jay’s decision rule “makes sense” in an ecological 
context. The phrase ecological rationality has come into use because it is as-
sociated with research on decision heuristics conducted by Gigerenzer and the 
ABC group (e.g., Todd et al. 2011b). However, some biologists (Kacelnik et 
al. 2006) have criticized Gigerenzer’s use of this term, because when applied 
to human heuristics it is used to describe a fi t between a decision mechanism 
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and the current environment. From an evolutionary perspective, however, the 
environment that matters is the ancestral selective environment (sometimes 
called the adaptively relevant environment). To make this distinction, Kacelnik 
has suggested the term  biological rationality to describe a rule that is rational 
in the adaptively relevant environment. Of course, if we are willing to assume 
 stationarity (e.g., the statistical properties of patches have remained the same 
since the Pleistocene), then this distinction would be relatively unimportant. 
The distinction is clearly quite important for the evaluation of human decision 
heuristics because the environment of modern humans is often thought to be 
quite different from the adaptively relevant environment for humans (although 
recent molecular-genetic evidence suggests that humans have been subject 
to multiple bouts of substantial selection signifi cantly more recently than the 
Pleistocene; e.g., Bustamante et al. 2005).
Patterning of behavior over time can often be selected for directly. Indeed, 
variability in behavior can be selected for when being predictable would fa-
cilitate exploitation by competitors and natural enemies. Such selection pres-
sures can be particularly acute in antipredatory contexts, where exposure to 
certain types of predators (e.g., stalkers) can favor individuals that behave as 
randomly as possible while at risk (Bednekoff and Lima 1998).
Among Individuals
When thinking about individual differences in behavior from an evolutionarily 
adaptive perspective, we have to distinguish at least three questions (Wolf and 
Weissing 2010): First, what factors favor the evolution of variation in behav-
ior, and/or the mechanisms underlying behavior, among individuals? Second, 
what factors favor the evolution of consistency in  behavior within a functional 
context? And third, what factors favor the evolution of behavioral correlations 
across different functional contexts?
In terms of the fi rst question, substantial effort in the evolutionary biol-
ogy literature has been devoted to understanding the causes of  adaptive varia-
tion. Evolutionary biologists typically recognize three major processes in this 
context:
1. Frequency-dependent selection: Competition for limiting resources, 
for example, can often select for mixtures of tactics to be expressed 
within populations, causing the increasingly common use of a tactic 
or strategy to render it less effective. Thus the fi tness returns from ex-
pressing it depend negatively on its frequency within the population.
2.  Spatiotemporal variation in the environment: Adaptive behavior can 
often vary within populations because different things are selected for 
at different times and in different places within the larger niche that a 
population occupies.
From “Evolution and the Mechanisms of Decision Making,” edited by Peter Hammerstein and Jeffrey R. Stevens. 
2012. Strüngmann Forum Report, vol. 11, J. Lupp, series ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 978-0-262-01808-1. 
268 S. R. X. Dall et al. 
3. Nonequilibrium dynamics: The constant infl ux of variants associated 
with nonadaptive processes, such as random dispersal and mutation, 
can give rise to substantial standing variation in traits (including behav-
iors) within populations.
Concerning the second question (consistency within contexts), it is important 
to consider that, from an adaptive perspective, the optimal action that an ani-
mal should take typically depends on its current state (e.g., energy level, expe-
rience) and thus rarely remains constant from one moment to the next. When 
positive feedbacks between state and behavior occur, they can amplify sto-
chastic variation among individuals and lock individuals into distinct regions 
of state space, causing individuals to differ consistently while such positive 
feedbacks persist (Dall et al. 2004). Indeed,  learning can generate such positive 
feedback as initial differences in early experience can encourage individuals 
to develop different skills and behave differently (Tinker et al. 2009). Finally, 
recent work suggests that behaving consistently can be selected for directly 
in social situations when doing so can cause social partners to respond more 
favorably than they otherwise would. This can occur whenever there is coevo-
lution between social responsiveness ( social information use) and behavioral 
consistency, which may be the case during aggressive competition over re-
sources (Dall et al. 2004; Wolf et al. 2011) and in some types of cooperative 
interactions (McNamara et al. 2009).
In terms of the third question (correlations across contexts), it is important 
to examine the factors that are likely to select for adaptive differences in under-
lying mechanisms that affect several traits at the same time: What should select 
for differences in metabolism or physiological commitments (e.g., neural tis-
sue) to information processing? Wolf et al. (2007), for example, addressed the 
question of why, in many organisms (ranging from octopuses to chimpanzees) 
is  boldness in novel and potentially dangerous situations often associated with 
aggressiveness in intraspecifi c interactions, whereas shyness is associated with 
less aggressive behavior. Based on the asset protection principle of life history 
theory (Clark 1994; Houston and McNamara 1988), they argue that individu-
als of high reproductive value (i.e., that have high future fi tness expectations) 
should be  risk-averse because they have much to lose, whereas individuals 
with low fi tness expectations should be more risk-prone because they could 
hardly end up worse off than they already are. Since this basic principle applies 
to behavior in all kind of risky situations (Dall 2010), differences in future fi t-
ness expectations should give rise to correlated differences in all kinds of risk-
related behaviors despite limited evidence for such domain-general attitudes 
to risk in humans (e.g., Weber et al. 2002). In the meantime, various empirical 
researchers have concluded that this principle can indeed explain a diversity 
of phenomena, ranging from the risk-prone “ personalities” of wild guinea 
pigs that are born relatively late in the season and, hence, have lower fi tness 
expectations (Groothuis and Trillmich 2011), to the risk-averse behavior of 
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oystercatchers breeding on high-quality territories (Goss-Custard 1996). More 
convincing than such indirect evidence is the outcome of a recent experiment 
on house  mice, which was designed to test the a priori prediction that female 
house mice of genotype t/+ should be more  risk-averse than their wild-type 
+/+ counterparts, while the opposite should be the case in males. Here, t refers 
to a certain gene locus (the t-complex) that does not directly affect the behav-
ior of house mice (e.g., it is associated with sperm motility). The prediction 
was based on the observation that heterozygous t/+ females have higher ex-
pected fi tness than homozygous +/+ females, while heterozygous males have 
lower fi tness expectations than homozygous wild-type males. Auclair et al. (in 
preparation) performed several personality tests, with outcomes generally in 
line with the predictions: in comparison to wild-type individuals, heterozygote 
females are more risk-averse, while heterozygote males seem to be more risk-
prone. Finally, Wolf et al. (2008) provided a theoretical explanation for the 
observation that  in many populations some individuals readily react to changes 
in their environment, while other individuals exhibit more rigid, routine-like 
behavior that is much less affected by environmental cues. Moreover, Wolf et 
al. predicted that responsiveness and rigidity should be relatively stable over 
lifetime and consistent across contexts. Both features are consistent with vari-
ous experiments, for example in ducks (Shettleworth 1998) and spice fi nches 
(Mottley and Giraldeau 2000), where environmental conditions were repeat-
edly changed by the experimenters. 
Among Groups
As discussed above, group differences can be an important source of variation 
in decision making when there is selection for  social information use and/or 
conformity. Social information use can be adaptive when evolutionary con-
fl icts of interest are minimal within groups (e.g., where group members are 
highly related or when competition for resources is reduced), and an individu-
al’s uncertainty about how to allocate behavior can be signifi cantly reduced by 
observing the behavior of group mates (Dall et al. 2005).  Copying the behavior 
of social partners, or  conformity, is a particular form of social information 
use; it is often the cheapest form of information use but carries substantial 
risks, stemming from the erroneous copying of inappropriate behaviors or “in-
formational cascades” (Dall et al. 2005).  Cultural  learning (both within and 
across generations) facilitates the tracking of intermediate rates of environ-
mental change (“red noise” environments) and will be often be selected for in 
species that are dependent on the populations of other species (e.g., predators), 
especially if they are marine (Whitehead 2007). This form of learning will 
maintain very substantial differences among groups, even without conformity, 
but conformity will exacerbate this type of variation.
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Variation and a Theory of Darwinian Decision Making
We have discussed variation in  decision making by individuals that have 
evolved by Darwinian selection from a range of perspectives: Does this really 
matter? What are the interesting scales of variation? What kind of mechanisms 
can generate it? How could it evolve? In the process, we hope to have high-
lighted the importance of explicitly considering variation both when attempt-
ing to predict economically and socially important patterns of behavior as well 
as to obtain a deeper understanding of the fundamental biological processes 
involved. Our approach so far has been rather piecemeal, with little attempt 
at any general understanding of the role that variation should play in an evo-
lutionary account of decision making. Thus we fi nish by sketching the key 
elements that we feel should be included when incorporating variation into a 
general theory of Darwinian decision making:
• Game theoretic approaches. The underlying structure of the problems 
that evolved entities is essentially coevolutionary. This is because ma-
jor components of the selective environments, to which individuals are 
subject, are biological in origin and will thus evolve. Therefore, speci-
fying the outcomes of evolution naturally lends itself to applying  evo-
lutionary  game theory. Moreover, variation is emerging as a key factor 
in determining outcomes predicted by evolutionary game theory. This 
has been illustrated a number of times in this chapter (e.g., how varia-
tion and socially acquired information use can coevolve to maintain in-
dividual variation in  trust and trustworthiness; McNamara et al. 2009).
• Does one general, all-purpose mechanism exist? Or does it refl ect diver-
sity of forms and function? The specifi c set of problems faced by indi-
viduals is likely to be different for different species (set by their specifi c 
ecological circumstances or niche, which will include their social envi-
ronments). Nevertheless, selection acts on existing variation so evolved 
systems are likely to share the basic components of a decision appara-
tus in proportion to their phylogenetic distance. Observable behavioral 
variation must therefore refl ect the constraints on the system. Thus the 
evolutionary history of a lineage must be considered explicitly when 
incorporating variation in Darwinian accounts of decision making.
•  Statistical decision theory ( Bayesian inference). All evolved systems are 
contingent, yet such contingencies will represent the prior experience of 
ancestral and developmental environments (contexts) as a result of prior 
adaptation. For adaptive decision making, such genetically or develop-
mentally induced priors will often need to be updated by more current 
experience. Specifying when or how such updates occur should be a 
major focus of an evolutionarily sensible theory of decision making, and 
statistical decision theory offers a formal framework that incorporates 
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this intuition very comfortably (Dall et al. 2005). Variation in behavioral 
allocation emerges naturally in Bayesian decision makers.
• The performance of alternative models of decision making should be 
assessed according to their fi tness consequences, which may or may 
not include explicit analysis of potential persistence over evolutionary 
time. Because of this, such assessments must include explicit consider-
ation of the fi tness costs and benefi ts of the rules considered. Moreover, 
performance must be assessed using invasibility analysis, which means 
that the competitive environment must be specifi ed, including the set 
of possible rules (as well as by assessing the evolutionary stability of 
rules). Thus standing variation, or the potential for variation, in deci-
sion making will be crucial when determining which rules are likely to 
evolve in particular systems.
• The statistical properties of the ecological (including social) context in 
which decision making evolved must be explicitly considered. What 
are the limits to potential specifi c models of decision making? (What 
is the ecological problem set?) While this is often diffi cult to specify in 
full detail for any given system, even identifying key statistical proper-
ties of typical ecological problems would help to identify the kinds of 
decision-making process that we should expect to see, and how they 
can vary in different contexts.
• For organisms subject to epigenetic development (i.e., develop from a 
totipotent cell), ontogeny will likely have a strong impact on individual 
variation (earlier environments will matter disproportionately). This 
suggests that attention should be focused on detailing such early infl u-
ences and how persistent they are likely to be.
• The adaptive tinkering and contingency to which evolved systems are 
subject will tend to limit the dimensionality of control mechanisms 
(key state variables), which can account for imperfect  optimization 
across contexts of higher dimensionality. The challenge will be to iden-
tify the key control mechanisms (e.g., sensory, cognitive processes) 
and how likely they are to vary both individually and phylogenetically.
• For humans (and some other animals),  cultural evolution is likely 
to play an infl uential role in driving variation in decision making. 
This suggests that social contingency and/or historical infl uences are 
likely to be pervasive when attempting to predict specifi c outcomes. 
Furthermore,  cultural variation will be bounded by genetic adaptation 
(e.g., many cultures have cleanliness-based practices that are likely to 
have evolved to mitigate the risk of infectious disease) and so studying 
the interplay between these factors will prove fruitful. Finally, basic 
psychological processes (e.g., salience) are likely to play a key role in 
determining how behavior varies over time and across cultural units 
(e.g., oddity effects, appeal to basic biological “drives,” etc.).
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Conclusions
It is clear that variation is central to understanding how individuals should and 
do behave, from both biological and human-centered perspectives. Perhaps 
this should not be too surprising since evolution is at the heart of any scientifi c 
(i.e., natural) account of biological (including human) systems, and there is no 
evolution by Darwinian selection without variation. Moreover, how individu-
als allocate their behavior is key to determining the evolutionary success, and 
hence existence, of their specifi c (heritable) traits. This interplay between be-
havior, variation, and evolutionary outcomes was a major theme of this chapter. 
Indeed, we hope to have illustrated how this interplay is central to promoting 
models of human behavior that can successfully predict individual behavior 
and identify interventions that are going to be effective in determining specifi c 
outcomes. To this end, our recommendations for incorporating variation into a 
theory of Darwinian decision making will hopefully draw attention. To para-
phrase Theodosius  Dobzhansky: We feel that no behavior, human or otherwise, 
makes sense except in the light of variation and, therefore, evolution!
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